Abstract. The mean field limit of large-population symmetric stochastic differential games is derived in a general setting, with and without common noise, on a finite time horizon. Minimal assumptions are imposed on equilibrium strategies, which may be asymmetric and based on full information. It is shown that approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games admit certain weak limits as n tends to infinity, and every limit is a weak solution of the mean field game (MFG). Conversely, every weak MFG solution can be obtained as the limit of a sequence of approximate Nash equilibria in the n-player games. Thus, the MFG precisely characterizes the possible limiting equilibrium behavior of the n-player games. Even in the setting without common noise, the empirical state distributions may admit stochastic limits which cannot be described by the usual notion of MFG solution.
Introduction
A decade of active research on mean field games (MFGs) has been driven by a primarily intuitive connection with large-population stochastic differential games of a certain symmetric type. The idea, which began with the pioneering work of Lasry and Lions [31] and Huang, Malhamé and Caines [21] , is that a large-population game of this type should behave similarly to its MFG counterpart, which may be thought of as an infinite-player version of the game. Rigorous analysis of this connection, however, remains restricted in scope. Following [21] , the vast majority of the literature works backward from the mean field limit, in the sense that a solution of the MFG is used to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the corresponding n-player games for large n. Fewer papers [31, 15, 2, 14] have approached from the other direction: given for each n a Nash equilibrium for the n-player game, in what sense (if any) do these equilibria converge as n tends to infinity? The goal of this paper is to address both of these problems in a general framework.
More precisely, we study an n-player stochastic differential game, in which the private state processes X 1 , . . . , X n of the agents (or players) are given by the following dynamics: Here B, W 1 , . . . , W n are independent Wiener processes, α i is the control of agent i, and µ n is the empirical distribution of the state processes. We call W 1 , . . . , W n the independent or idiosyncratic noises, since agent i feels only W i directly, and we call B the common noise, since each agent feels B equally. The reward to agent i of the strategy profile (α 1 , . . . , α n ) is Agent i seeks to maximize this reward, and so we say that (α 1 , . . . , α n ) form an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (or an approximate Nash equilibrium) if
. . , α n ) + ǫ ≥ J i (α 1 , . . . , α i−1 , β, α i+1 , . . . , α n )
for each admissible alternative strategy β. Intuitively, if the number of agents n is very large, a single representative agent has little influence on the empirical measure flow ( µ this agent expects to lose little in the way of optimality by ignoring her own effect on the empirical measure. Crucially, the system is symmetric in the sense that the same functions (b, σ, σ 0 ) and (f, g) determine the dynamics and objectives of each agent, and thus we may hope to learn something of the entire system from the behavior of a single representative agent.
The mean field game is specified precisely in Section 2, and it follows this intuition by treating n as infinite. Loosely speaking, a strong MFG solution is a (F = b(t, X α t , µ t , α t )dt + σ(t, X α t , µ t )dW t + σ 0 (t, X α t , µ t )dB t . In other words, with the process (µ t ) t∈[0,T ] treated as fixed, the representative agent solves an optimal control problem. The requirement µ t = Law(X α * t | F B t ), often known as a consistency condition, assures us that this decoupled optimal control problem is truly representative of the entire population, and we may think of the measure flow (µ t ) t∈[0,T ] as an equilibrium.
The analysis of this paper focuses on mean field games with common noise, but both of the volatility coefficients σ and σ 0 are allowed to be degenerate. Hence, our results cover the usual mean field games without common noise (where σ 0 ≡ 0) as well as deterministic mean field games (where σ ≡ σ 0 ≡ 0). The literature on mean field games with common noise is quite scarce so far, but some general analysis is provided in the recent papers [11, 1, 9, 5] , and some specific models were studied in [12, 19] . This paper can be seen as a sequel to [11] , from which we borrow many definitions and a handful of lemmas. It is emphasized in [11] that strong solutions are quite difficult to obtain when common noise is present, and this leads to a notion of weak MFG solution. Weak solutions, defined carefully in Section 2.2, differ most significantly from strong solutions in that the measure flow (µ t ) t∈[0,T ] need not be (F = σ(B s , µ s : s ≤ t). Additionally, weak MFG solutions allow for relaxed (i.e. measure-valued) controls which need not be adapted to the filtration generated by the inputs (X 0 , B, W, µ) of the control problem.
Although this weaker notion of MFG solution was introduced in [11] to develop an existence and uniqueness theory for MFGs with common noise, the main result of this paper is to assert that this notion is the right one from the point of view of the finite-player game, in the sense that weak MFG solutions characterize the limits of approximate Nash equilibria. The main results are stated in full generality in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, but let us state them loosely for now in a simplified form: First, we show that if for each n we are given an ǫ n -Nash equilibrium (α n,1 , . . . , α n,n ) for the n-player game, where ǫ n → 0, then the family (Law(B, µ n )) ∞ n=1 is tight, and every weak limit agrees with the law of (B, µ) coming from some weak MFG solution. Second, we show conversely that every weak MFG solution can be obtained as a limit in this way.
Specializing our results to the case without common noise uncovers something unexpected. In the literature thus far, a MFG solution is defined in terms of a deterministic equilibrium (µ t ) t∈[0,T ] , corresponding to our notion of strong MFG solution. Even when there is no common noise, a weak MFG solution still involves a stochastic equilibrium, and because of our main theorems we must therefore expect the limits of the finite-player empirical measures to remain stochastic. Moreover, we demonstrate by a simple example that a stochastic equilibrium is not necessarily just a randomization among the family of deterministic equilibria. Hence, the solution concept considered thusfar in literature on mean field games (without common noise) does not fully capture the limiting dynamics of finite-player approximate Nash equilibria. This is unlike the case of McKean-Vlasov limits (see [32, 16, 34] ), which can be seen as mean field games with no control. We prove some admittedly difficult-to-apply results which nevertheless shed some light on this phenomenon: The fundamental obstruction is the adaptedness required of controls, which renders the class of admissible controls quite sensitive to whether or not (µ t ) t∈[0,T ] is stochastic.
Our first theorem, regarding the convergence of arbitrary approximate equilibria (open-loop, full-information, and possibly asymmetric), is arguably the more novel of our two main theorems. It appears to be the first result of its kind for mean field games with common noise, with the exception of the linear quadratic model of [12] for which explicit computations are available. However, even in the setting without common noise we subtantially generalize the few existing results.
Several papers, such as the recent [9] dealing with common noise, contain purely heuristic derivations of the MFG as the limit of n-player games. The intuition guiding such derivations is as follows (and let us assume there is no common noise for the sake of simplicity): If n is large, a single agent in a large population should lose little in the way of optimality if she ignores the small feedbacks arising through the empirical measure flow ( µ n t ) t∈ [0,T ] . If each of the n identical agents does this, then we expect to see symmetric strategies which are nearly independent and ideally of the formα(t, X i t ), for some feedback controlα common to all of the agents. From the theory of McKean-Vlasov limits, we then expect that ( µ n t ) t∈[0,T ] converges to a deterministic limit. This intuition, however, is largely unsubstantiated and, we will argue, inaccurate in general.
Lasry and Lions [31, 30] first attacked this problem rigorously using PDE methods, working with an infinite time horizon and strong simplifying assumptions on the data, and their results were later generalized by Feleqi [14] . Bardi and Priuli [2, 3] justified the MFG limit for certain linear-quadratic problems, and Gomes et al. [17] studied models with finite state space. Substantial progress was made in a very recent paper of Fischer [15] , which deserves special mention also because both the level of generality and the method of proof are quite similar to ours; we will return to this shortly.
With the exception of [15] , the aforementioned results share the important limitation that the agents have only partial information: the control of agent i may depend only on her own state process X n,i or Wiener process W i . Our results allow for arbitrary full-information strategies, settling a conjecture of Lasry and Lions (stated in Remark x after [31, Theorem 2.3] for the case of infinite time horizon). Combined in [31, 30, 14] with the assumption that the state process coefficients (b, σ) do not depend on the empirical measure, the assumption of partial information leads to the immensely useful simplification that the state processes of the n-player games are independent. By showing then that they are also asymptotically identically distributed, the aforementioned heuristic argument can be made precise.
Fischer [15] , on the other hand, allows for full-information controls but characterizes only the deterministic limits of ( µ n t ) t∈[0,T ] as MFG equilibria. Assuming that the limit is deterministic implicitly restricts the class of n-player equilibria in question. By characterizing even the stochastic limits of ( µ n t ) t∈[0,T ] , which we show are in fact quite typical, we impose no such restriction on the equilibrium strategies of the n-player games. This not to say, however, that our results completely subsume those of [15] , which work with a more general notion of local approximate equilibria and which notably include conditions under which the assumption of a deterministic limit can be verified.
Our second main theorem, which asserts that every weak MFG solution is attainable as a limit of finite-player approximate Nash equilibria, is something of an abstraction of the kind of limiting result most commonly discussed in the MFG literature. In a tradition beginning with [21] and continued by the majority of the probabilistic papers on the subject [8, 13, 6, 4, 27] , an optimal control from an MFG solution is used to construct approximate equilibria for the finite-player games. Although our result applies in more general settings, our conclusions are duly weaker, in the sense that the approximate equilibria we construct do not necessarily consist of particularly tangible (i.e. distributed or even symmetric) strategies. We emphasize that the goal of this work is not to construct nice approximate equilibria but rather to characterize all possible limits of approximate equilibria.
It is worth emphasizing that this paper makes no claims whatsoever regarding the existence or uniqueness of equilibria for either the n-player game or the MFG. Rather, we show that if a sequence of n-player approximate equilibria exists, then its limits are described by weak MFG solutions. Conversely, if a weak MFG solution exists, then it is achieved as the limit of some sequence of n-player approximate equilibria. Hence, existence of a weak MFG solution is equivalent to existence of a sequence of n-player approximate equilibria. Note, however, that the main assumption A of this paper actually guarantees the existence of a weak MFG solution, because of the recent results of [11] . Far more results are available for MFGs without common noise; refer to the surveys [7, 18] and the recent book [4] for a wealth of wellposedness results and for further discussion of MFG theory in general.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the MFG and the corresponding n-player games, before stating the main limit Theorem 2.6 and its converse, Theorem 2.11, along with several useful corollaries. Section 3 specializes the results to the more familiar setting without common noise and explains the gap between weak and strong solutions. Section 4 provides some background on weak solutions of MFGs with common noise, borrowed from [11] , before we turn to the proofs of the main results in Sections 5, 6, and 7. Section 5 is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.6, while Section 6 contains the proof of the converse Theorem 2.11. Finally, Section 7 explains how to carefully specialize these two theorems to the setting without common noise.
The mean field limit with common noise
After establishing some notation, this section first defines quickly and concisely the mean field game. We work with the same definitions and nearly the same assumptions as [11] , to which the reader is referred for a more thorough discussion. Then, the n-player game is formulated precisely, allowing for somewhat more general information structures than one usually finds in the literature on stochastic differential games. This generality is not just for its own sake; it will play a crucial role in the proofs later.
2.1. Notation and standing assumptions. For a topological space E, let B(E) denote the Borel σ-field, and let P(E) denote the set of Borel probability measures on E. For p ≥ 1 and a separable metric space (E, d), let P p (E) denote the set of µ ∈ P(E) satisfying E d p (x, x 0 )µ(dx) < ∞ for some (and thus for any) x 0 ∈ E. Let ℓ E,p denote the p-Wasserstein distance on P p (E), given by
Unless otherwise stated, the space P p (E) is equipped with the metric ℓ E,p , and all continuity and measurability statements involving P p (E) are with respect to ℓ E,p and the corresponding Borel σ-field. The analysis of the paper will make routine use of several topological properties of the spaces P p (E) and P p (P p (E)), especially when E is a product space. All of the results we need, well known or not, are summarized in the Appendices A and B of [29] .
We are given a time horizon T > 0, three exponents (p ′ , p, p σ ) with p ≥ 1, a control space A, an initial state distribution λ ∈ P(R d ), and the following functions:
Assume throughout the paper that the following assumption A holds. This is exactly Assumption A of [11] , except that here we require that p ′ ≥ 2 and that (b, σ, σ 0 ) are Lipschitz not only in the state argument but also in the measure argument.
Assumption A.
(A.1) A is a closed subset of a Euclidean space. (More generally, as in [20] , a closed σ-compact subset of a Banach space would suffice.) (A.2) The exponents satisfy p ′ > p ≥ 1 ∨ p σ and p ′ ≥ 2 ≥ p σ ≥ 0, and also λ ∈ P
3) The functions b, σ, σ 0 , f , and g of (t, x, µ, a) are jointly measurable and are continuous in (x, µ, a) for each t. (A.4) There exists c 1 > 0 such that, for all (t, x, y, µ, ν, a)
and
While these assumptions are fairly general, they do not cover all linear-quadratic models. Because of the requirement p ′ > p, the running objectve f may grow quadratically in a only if its growth in (x, µ) is strictly subquadratic. This requirement is important for compactness purposes, both for the results of this paper and for the existence results of [29, 11] . In fact, [29, 11] provide examples of MFGs with p ′ = p which do not admit solutions even though they verify the rest of assumption A. Existence results for this somewhat delicate boundary case have been obtained in [8, 10, 6, 12] by assuming some additional inequalities between coefficients. It seems feasible to expect our main results to adapt to such settings, but we do not pursue this here.
2.2.
Relaxed controls and mean field games. Define V to be the set of measures q on [0, T ] × A with first marginal equal to Lebesgue measure, i.e. q([s, t] × A) = t − s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , satisfying also
Since these measures have mass T , we may endow V with a suitable scaling of the p-Wasserstein metric. Each q ∈ V may be identified with a measurable function [0, T ] ∋ t → q t ∈ P p (A), determined uniquely (up to a.e. equality) by dtq t (da) = q(dt, da). It is known that V is a Polish space, and in fact if A is compact then so is V; see [29, Appendix A] for more details. The elements of V are called relaxed controls, and q ∈ V is called a strict control if it satisfies q(dt, da) = dtδ αt (da) for some measurable function [0, T ] ∋ t → α t ∈ A. Finally, if we are given a measurable process (Λ t ) t∈[0,T ] with values in P(A) defined on some measurable space and with T 0 A |a| p Λ t (da)dt < ∞, we write Λ = dtΛ t (da) for the corresponding random element of V.
Let us define some additional canonical spaces. For a positive integer k let C k = C([0, T ]; R k ) denote the set of continuous functions from [0, T ] to R k , and define the truncated supremum norms · t on C k by
Unless otherwise stated, C k is endowed with the norm · T and its Borel σ-field. For µ ∈ P(C k ), let µ t ∈ P(R k ) denote the image of µ under the map x → x t . Let
This space will house the idiosyncratic noise, the relaxed control, and the state process. Let (F X t ) t∈[0,T ] denote the canonical filtration on X , where F X t is the σ-field generated by the maps
Finally, for ease of notation let us define the objective functional Γ :
The following definition of weak mean field game (MFG) solution is borrowed from [11] . 
-progressively measurable with values in P(A) and
(4) The state equation holds:
(6) µ is a version of the conditional law of (W, Λ, X) given (B, µ). Given a weak MFG solution ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, B, W, µ, Λ, X), we may view (X 0 , B, W, µ, Λ, X) as a random element of the canonical space
If also there exists an
A weak MFG solution thus induces a probability measure on Ω, which itself we would like to call a MFG solution, as it is really the object of interest more than the particular probability space. The following definition will be reformulated in Section 4 in a more intrinsic manner.
, then we refer to P itself as a weak MFG solution. Naturally, we may also refer to P as a weak MFG solution with strict control or strong control, or as a strong MFG solution, under the analogous additional assumptions.
2.3. Finite-player games. This section describes a general form of the finite-player games, allowing controls to be relaxed and adapted to general filtrations.
An n-player environment is defined to be any tuple
, independent of B. For simplicity, we consider i.i.d. initial states ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n with common law λ, although it is presumably possible to generalize this. Perhaps all of the notation here should be parametrized by E n or an additional index for n, but, since we will typically focus on a fixed sequence of environments (E n ) ∞ n=1 , we avoid complicating the notation. Indeed, the subscript n on the measure P n will be enough to remind us on which environment we are working at any moment.
Until further notice, we work with a fixed n-player environment E n . An admissible control is any (
An admissible strategy is a vector of n admissible controls. The set of admissible controls is denoted A n (E n ), and accordingly the set of admissible strategies is the Cartesian product A n n (E n ). A strict control is any control Λ ∈ A n (E n ) such that P n (Λ t = δ αt , a.e. t) = 1 for some (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] -progressively measurable A-valued process (α t ) t∈[0,T ] , and a strict strategy is any vector of n strict controls. Given an admissible control Λ = (Λ 1 , . . . , Λ n ) ∈ A n n (E n ) define the state processes
Note that assumption A ensures that a unique strong solution of this SDE system exists
1
. Indeed, the Lipschitz assumption of (A.4) and the obvious inequality
is Lipschitz, uniformly in (t, a). A standard estimate using assumption (A.4), which is worked out in Lemma 5.1, shows that
. Note that J i (Λ) < ∞ is well-defined because of the upper bounds of assumption (A.5), but it is possible that J i (Λ) = −∞, since we do not require that an admissible control possess finite moment of order p ′ . Given a strategy Λ = (
Naturally, if ǫ i = 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n, we use the simpler term Nash equilibrium, as opposed to 0-Nash equilibrium. A strict ǫ-Nash equilibrium in E n is any strict strategy Λ ∈ A n n (E n ) satisfying
Note that the optimality is required only among strict controls. Note that the role of the filtration (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] in the environment E n is mainly to specify the class of admissible controls. We are particularly interested in the sub-filtration generated by the Wiener processes and initial states; define (F s,n t ) t∈[0,T ] to be the P n -completion of (σ(ξ, B s , W s : s ≤ t)) t∈[0,T ] . Of course, F s,n t ⊂ F n t for each t. Let us say that Λ ∈ A n (E n ) is a strong control if P n (Λ t = δ αt a.e. t) = 1 for some (F s,n t ) t∈[0,T ] -progressively measurable A-valued process (α t ) t∈[0,T ] . Naturally, a strong strategy is a vector of strong controls. A strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium in E n is any strong strategy Λ ∈ A n n (E n ) such that
The most common type of Nash equilibrium considered in the literature is, in our terminology, a strong Nash equilibrium. The next proposition assures us that our equilibrium concept using relaxed controls (and general filtrations) truly generalizes this more standard situation, thus permitting a unified analysis of all of the equilibria described thusfar. The proof is deferred to Appendix A.1.
Proposition 2.4. On any n-player environment E n , every strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a strict ǫ-Nash equilibrium, and every strict ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2.5. Another common type of strategy in dynamic game theory is called closed-loop. Whereas our strategies (also called open-loop) are specified by processes, a closed-loop (strict) strategy is specified by feedback functions
. . , n, to be evaluated along the path of the state process. In the model of Carmona et al. [12] , both the open-loop and closedloop equilibria are computed explicitly for the n-player games, and they are shown to converge to the same MFG limit. There is no distinction between open-loop and closed-loop in the MFG, and this begs the question of whether or not closed-loop equilibria converge to the same MFG limit that we obtain in Theorem 2.6. This paper does not attempt to answer this question.
2.4. The main limit theorem. We are ready now to state the first main Theorem 2.6 and its corollaries. The proof is deferred to Section 5. Given an admissible strategy Λ = (
As usual, we identify a P(A)-valued process (Λ 
is a relaxed ǫ n -Nash equilibrium, and let
is relatively compact in P p (Ω), and each limit point is a weak MFG solution.
Remark 2.7. Averaging over i = 1, . . . , n in (2.8) circumvents the problem that the strategies (Λ n,1 , . . . , Λ n,n ) need not be exchangeable, and we note that the limiting behavior of
can always be recovered from that of P n . To interpret the definition of P n , note that we may write
where U n is a random variable independent of F n T , uniformly distributed among {1, . . . , n}, constructed by extending the probability space Ω n . In words, P n is the joint law of the processes relevant to a randomly selected representative agent. Of course, Theorem 2.6 specializes when there is exchangeability, in the following sense. For any set E, any element e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ E n , and any permutation π of {1, . . . , n}, let e π := (e π(1) , . . . , e π(n) ). If
is independent of the choice of permutation π, then so is
It then follows that
Theorem 2.6 is stated in quite a bit of generality, devoid even of standard convexity assumptions on the objective functions f and g. Theorem 2.6 includes quite degenerate cases, such as the case of no objectives, where f ≡ g ≡ 0 and A is compact. In this case, any strategy profile whatsoever in the n-player game is a Nash equilibrium, and any weak control can arise in the limit. Exploiting results of [11] , the following corollaries demonstrate how, under various additional convexity assumptions, we may refine the conclusion of Theorem 2.6 by ruling out certain types of limits, such as those involving relaxed controls.
Corollary 2.8. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 2.6 hold, and assume also that for each
, and every limit is of the form P •(B, W, µ x , X) −1 , for some weak MFG solution with strict control ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, B, W, µ, Λ, X).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.6 and the argument of [11, Theorem 4.1] . Indeed, the latter shows that for every weak MFG solution with weak control ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, B, W, µ, Λ, X), there exists a weak MFG solution with strict control (
Corollary 2.9. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 2.6 hold, and define P n as in (2.8). Assume also that for each fixed
is concave in x, and f (t, x, µ, a) is strictly concave in (x, a). Then (P n ) ∞ n=1 is relatively compact in P p (Ω), and every limit point is a weak MFG solution with strong control.
Proof. By [11, Proposition 4.4] , the present assumptions guarantee that every weak MFG solution is a weak MFG solution with strong control. The claim then follows from Theorem 2.6.
Finally, we provide an example of the satisfying situation, in which there is a unique MFG solution. Say that uniqueness in law holds for the MFG if any two weak MFG solutions induce the same law on Ω. The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.6 and the uniqueness result of [11, Theorem 6.2] , which makes use of the monotonicity assumption of Lasry and Lions [31].
Corollary 2.10. Suppose the assumptions of Corollary 2.9 hold, and define P n as in (2.8). Assume also that (1) b, σ, and σ 0 have no mean field term, i.e. no µ dependence,
Then there exists a unique in law weak MFG solution, and it is a strong MFG solution with strong control. In particular, P n converges in P p (Ω) to this unique MFG solution.
2.5. The converse limit theorem. This section states and discusses a converse to Theorem 2.6. For this, we need an additional technical assumption, which we note holds automatically under assumption A in the case that the control space A is compact.
Assumption B. The function f of (t, x, µ, a) is continuous in (x, µ), uniformly in a, for each
Moreover, there exists c 4 > 0 such that, for all (t, x, x ′ , µ, µ ′ , a),
Theorem 2.11. Suppose assumptions A and B hold. Let P ∈ P(Ω) be a weak MFG solution, and for each n let E n = (Ω n , (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] , P n , ξ, B, W ) be any n-player environment. Then there exist, for each n, ǫ n ≥ 0 and a strong (ǫ n , . . . , ǫ n )-Nash equilibrium Λ n = (Λ n,1 , . . . , Λ n,n ) on E n , such that lim n→∞ ǫ n = 0 and
Combining Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 shows that the set of weak MFG solutions is exactly the set of limits of strong approximate Nash equilibria. More precisely, the set of weak MFG solutions is exactly the set of limits
where Λ n ∈ A n n (E n ) are strong ǫ n -Nash equilibria and
. The same statement is true when the word "strong" is replaced by "strict" or "relaxed", because of Proposition 2.4. Similarly, combining Theorem 2.11 with Corollaries 2.8 and 2.9 yields characterizations of the mean field limit without recourse to relaxed controls. Remark 2.12. In light of Remark 2.3, the statement of Theorem 2.11 is insensitive to the choice of environments E n . Without loss of generality, they may all be assumed to satisy F n t = F s,n t for each t; that is, the filtration may be taken to be the one generated by the process (ξ,
Remark 2.13. It follows from the proofs of Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 that the values converge as well, in the sense that
converges (along a subsequence in the case of Theorem 2.6) to the corresponding optimal value corresponding to the MFG solution.
Remark 2.14. Theorem 2.11 is admittedly abstract, and not as strong in its conclusion as the typical results of this nature in the literature. Namely, in the setting without common noise, it is usually argued as in [21] that a MFG solution may be used to construct not just any sequence of approximate equilibria, but rather one consisting of symmetric distributed strategies, in which the control of agent i is of the formα(t, X i t ) for some functionα which depends neither on the agent i nor the number of agents n. The techniques of this paper seem too abstract to yield a result of this nature, but in any case this would stray from the objective of the paper. On a somewhat related note, at the level of generality of Theorem 2.11 we do not expect to obtain a rate of convergence of ǫ n , as in [27, 8] .
The case of no common noise
The goal of this section is to specialize the main results to MFGs without common noise. Indeed we assume that σ 0 ≡ 0 throughout this section. Assumption A permits degenerate volatility, but when σ 0 ≡ 0 our general definition of weak MFG solution still involves the common noise B, which in a sense should no longer play any role. To be absolutely clear, we will rewrite the definitions and the two main theorems so that they do not involve a common noise; most notably, the notion of strong controls for the finite-player games is refined to very strong controls.
The proofs of the main results of Section 3.1, Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.4, are deferred to Section 7, where we will see how to deduce almost all of the results without common noise from those with common noise. Crucially, even without common noise, a weak MFG solution still involves a random measure µ, and the consistency condition becomes µ = P ((W, Λ, X) ∈ · | µ). We illustrate by example just how different weak solutions can be from the strong solutions typically considered in the MFG literature, in which µ is deterministic. Finally we close the section by discussing some situations in which weak solutions are concentrated on the family of strong solutions.
3.1. Definitions and results. First, let us state a simplified definition of MFG solution for the case σ 0 ≡ 0, which is really just Definition 2.1 rewritten without B. Again, the following definition is relative to the initial state distribution λ.
is a complete filtered probability space supporting (W, µ, Λ, X) satisfying
(6) µ is a version of the conditional law of (W, Λ, X) given µ.
As in Definition 2.2, we may refer to the law P • (W, µ, Λ, X) −1 itself as a weak MFG solution. Again, if also there exists an A-valued process (α t ) t∈[0,T ] such that P (Λ t = δ αt a.e. t) = 1, then we say the MFG solution has strict control. If this (α t ) t∈[0,T ] is progressively measurable with respect to the completion of (F X0,W,µ t ) t∈[0,T ] , we say the MFG solution has strong control. If µ is a.s.-constant, then we have a strong MFG solution without common noise. In this case, we may abuse the terminology somewhat by saying that a measure µ ∈ P p (X ) is itself a strong MFG solution (without common noise), if there exists a weak MFG solution ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) without common noise such that P (µ = µ) = 1.
Remark 3.2. Our notion of strong MFG solution without common noise with strong control corresponds to the usual definition of MFG solution in the literature. It is exactly the definition used in the recent papers [15, 29] , and it is a generalization of the more standard definition of MFG solution without common noise found in [21, 8, 6 ], for example. The latter papers require optimality only relative to other strong controls, not among all weak controls as we do in condition (5) of Definition 3.1. Under assumption A, however, optimality among strong controls implies optimality among weak controls, and thus our definition does include this more standard one. This is the same phenomenon driving Propositions 2.4 and 3.3, and it is well known in control theory. Remark 6.5 will elaborate on this point, and see also [24] or the more recent [26] for further dicussion.
We continue to work with the definition of the n-player games of the previous section. Suppose we are given an n-player environment E n = ( Ω n , (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] , P n , ξ, B, W ), as was defined in Section 2.3. Let (F vs,n t
, that is the filtration generated by the initial state and the idiosyncratic noises (but not the common noise). Let us say that a control Λ ∈ A n (E n ) is a very strong control if P n (Λ t = δ αt a.e. t) = 1, for some (F vs,n t
n , a very strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium in E n is any very strong strategy Λ ∈ A n n (E n ) such that
The very strong equilibrium is arguably the most natural notion of equilibrium in the case of no common noise, and it is certainly one of the most common in the literature. The proof of the following Proposition is deferred to Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3.3. When σ 0 ≡ 0, every very strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
The following Theorem 3.4 rewrites Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 in the setting without common noise. Although this is mostly derived from Theorems 2.6 and 2.11, the proof is spelled out in Section 7, as it is not entirely straightforward.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose σ 0 ≡ 0. Theorem 2.6 remains true if the term "weak MFG solution" is replaced by "weak MFG solution without common noise," and if P n is defined instead by
Theorem 2.11 remains true if "weak MFG solution" is replaced by "weak MFG solution without common noise," if P n is defined by (3.2), and if "strong" is replaced by "very strong."
Since strong MFG solutions are more familiar in the literature on mean field games and presumably more accessible computationally, it would be nice to have a description of weak solutions in terms of strong solutions. We will see that this is not possible in general, and the investigation of this issue highlights the fundamental difference between stochastic and deterministic equilibria (i.e. weak and strong MFG solutions). First, a discussion of a special case will help to clarify the ideas.
A digression on McKean-Vlasov equations.
When there is no control (when A is a singleton), the mean field game reduces to a McKean-Vlasov equation. In this case, an interesting simplification occurs: every weak solution is simply a randomization over strong solutions. To be more clear, suppose we have a system of weakly interacting diffusions, given by
A common argument in the theory of McKean-Vlasov limits [32, 16, 34] is to show, under suitable assumptions on (b,σ), that (µ n ) ∞ n=1 is tight, and that every weak limit point (an element of P(P(C d ))) is concentrated on the set of solutions µ ∈ P(C d ) of the following strong McKean-Vlasov equation:
Consider also searching for a P(C d )-valued random variable µ satisfying the weak McKean-Vlasov equation:
It is not too difficult to convince yourself that a P(C d )-valued random variable satisfies the weak McKean-Vlasov equation if and only if it almost surely satisfies the strong McKean-Vlasov equation. That is, every weak solution is supported on the set of strong solutions. In particular, we find that the set of strong McKean-Vlasov solutions is rich enough to characterize all of the possible limiting behaviors of the finite-particle systems.
In general, no such simplification is available for mean field games. This is essentially because the adaptedness requirement makes the class of admissible controls quite dependent on how random µ is. To highlight this point, Section 3.3 below describes a model possessing weak MFG solutions which are not randomizations of strong MFG solutions. Subsection 3.4 discusses some partial results on when this simplification can occur in the MFG setting.
3.3. An illuminating example. This section describes a deceptively simple example which illustrates the difference between weak and strong solutions. Consider the time horizon T = 2, the initial state distribution λ = δ 0 , and the following data (still with σ 0 ≡ 0):
where for ν ∈ P 1 (R) we defineν := xν(dx). Similarly, for µ ∈ P 1 (X ) writeμ
. Assumption A is verified by choosing p = 2, p σ = 0, and any p ′ > 2. Let us first study the optimization problems arising in the MFG problem. Let ( Ω, (
, where
Independence of W and µ implies
where
, where the last equality follows from independence of (X 0 , W ) and µ, and
Condition (5) of Definition 3.1 implies that Λ maximizes J over all such processes β, which implies that Λ t (ω) must equal δ α * t (ω) on the (t, ω)-set {α * = 0}, where
, and we use the convention sign(0) := 0.
Remark 3.5. This already highlights the key point: When µ is deterministic, an optimal control is the constant sign(μ x 2 ), but when µ is random, this control is inadmissible since it is not adapted. Proposition 3.6. Every strong MFG solution (without common noise) satisfiesμ
Proof. Let ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,2] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) satisfy Definition 3.1, with µ deterministic. In this case, α * t = sign(μ 2 ) for all t. Suppose thatμ x 2 = 0. Then Λ t = δ α * t must hold dt ⊗ dP -a.e., and thus
The consistency condition (6) of Definition 3.1 impliesμ
There exists a weak MFG solution (without common noise) satisfying P (μ
Proof. Construct on some probability space ( Ω, F , P ) a random variable γ with P (γ = 1) = P (γ = −1) = 1/2 and an independent Wiener process W . Let α * t = γ1 (1, 2] (t) for each t (noticing that this interval is open on the left), and define (F t ) t∈[0,2] to be the complete filtration generated by (W t , α * t ) t∈ [0, 2] . Let
Finally, let Λ = dtδ α * t (da), and define µ := P ((W, Λ, X) ∈ · | γ). Clearly µ is γ-measurable. On the other hand, independence of γ and W implies
Thus γ is also µ-measurable, and we conclude that µ := P ((W, Λ, X) ∈ · | µ). It is straightforward to check that
. It is then readly checked using the previous arguments that ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,2] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution.
To be absolutely clear, the above two propositions imply the following: If S := {ν ∈ P(X ) : ν x 2 ∈ {−2, 0, 2}}, then every strong MFG solution lies in S, but there exists a weak MFG solution with P (µ ∈ S) = 0. (3.3) ; the agent then has some freedom to randomize her choice of control among the family of non-unique optimal choices. This type of randomization can typically occur when optimal controls are non-unique, and although it is unnatural in some sense, our main results indicate that this behavior can indeed arise in the limit from the finite-player games.
3.4. Supports of weak solutions. In this section, we attempt to partially explain what permits the existence of weak solutions which are not randomizations among strong solutions. As was mentioned in Remark 3.5, the culprit is the adaptedness required of controls. Indeed, in the example of Section 3.3, very different optimal controls arise depending on whether or not the measure µ is random. If µ is deterministic, then so is the optimal control, and we may write this optimal control as a functional of µ byα
The problem is as follows: for each fixed deterministic µ, the optimal control (α D (t, µ)) t∈[0,T ] is deterministic and thus trivially adapted, but when µ is allowed to be random then this control is no longer adapted and thus no longer admissible. If, for a different MFG problem, it happens thatα D is in fact progressively measurable with respect to (F µ t ) t∈[0,T ] , then this control is still admissible when µ is randomized; moreover, it should be optimal when µ is randomized, since it was optimal for each realization of µ. The following results make this idea precise, but first some terminology will be useful. As usual we work under assumption A at all times, and the initial state distribution
Definition 3.9. We say that a functionα :
(1)α is progressively measurable with respect to the (universal completion of the) natural filtration (F W,X,µ t
is unique in joint law; that is, if we are given two pairs of processes (W i
Wiener process W , an F 0 -measurable R d -valued random variable ξ with law λ, and a P p (X )-valued random variableμ independent of (ξ, W ) such thatμ(C) is F t -measurable for each C ∈ F X t and t ∈ [0, T ]. Then there exists a strong solution X of the SDE
and it satisfies E T 0
Ifα is a universally admissible control, we say it is locally optimal if for each fixed ν ∈ P p (X ) there exists a complete filtered probability space ( 
We need an additional assumption C, which simply requires the uniqueness of the optimal controls. Some simple conditions are given in [11, Proposition 4.4] under which assumption C holds: in particular, it suffices to assume that b and σ are affine in (x, a), that f is strictly concave in (x, a), and that g is concave in x.
Theorem 3.10. Assume C holds. Suppose that there exists a universally admissible and locally optimal controlα :
Then, for every weak MFG solution ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) (without common noise), P • µ −1 is concentrated on the set of strong MFG solutions (without common noise). Conversely, if ρ ∈ P p (P p (X )) is concentrated on the set of strong MFG solutions (without common noise), then there exists a weak MFG solution (without common noise) with P • µ −1 = ρ.
Proof. Let ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) be a weak MFG solution (without common noise).
Step 1: We will first show that necessarily Λ t = δα (t,W,X,µ) holds dt ⊗ dP -a.e. On ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P ) we may use (3) of Definition 3.9 to find a strong solution X ′ of the SDE
In particular, X ′ is adapted to the (completion of the) filtration
On the other hand, for P • µ −1 -a.e. ν ∈ P p (X ), the following hold under P (· | µ = ν):
• W is a (F t ) t∈[0,T ] -Wiener process.
• (W, Λ, X) satisfies
• (W, X ′ ) solves the SDE (3.4).
From the local optimality ofα we conclude (keeping in mind the uniqueness condition (2) of Definition 3.9) that
.
By assumption C, there is only one optimal control, and so Λ = Λ ′ = dtδα (t,W,X ′ ,µ) (da), P -a.s. From uniqueness of the SDE solutions we conclude that X = X ′ a.s. as well, completing the first step. (Note we do not use the assumptions of Definition 3.9 for this last conclusion, but only the Lipschitz assumption (A.4).)
Step 2: Next, we show that P • µ −1 is concentrated on the set of strong MFG solutions. Using (2) and (3) of Definition 3.9, we know that for P • µ −1 -a.e. ν ∈ P p (X ) there exists on some filtered
It follows from the P -independence of µ, X 0 , and W along with the uniqueness in law of condition (2) of Definition 3.9 that
We conclude that P • µ −1 -a.e. ν ∈ P p (X ) is a strong MFG solution, or more precisely that
is a strong MFG solution. Indeed, we just verified condition (6) of Definition 3.1, and conditions (1-4) are obvious. The optimality condition (5) of Definition 3.1 is a simple consequence of the local optimality ofα
Step 3: We turn now to the converse. Let ( Ω, F , P ) be any probability space supporting a random variable (ξ, W, µ) with values in
Note that hypothesis (3) makes this possible. Define Λ := dtδα (t,W,X,µ) (da). Clearly P • µ −1 = ρ by construction, and we claim that ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution. Using hypothesis (1), it is clear that conditions (1-4) of Definition 3.1 hold, and thus we must only check the optimality condition (5) and the fixed point condition (6).
be an alternative probability space satisfying (1-4) of Definition 3.1 and
The uniqueness in law condition (2) of Definition 3.9 implies that P (((W, X) ∈ · | µ = ν) is exactly the law of the solution of the SDE (3.4), for P • µ −1 -a.e. ν. Applying local optimality ofα for each ν, we conclude that
Integrate with respect to ρ on both sides to get
, which verifies condition (5) of Definition 3.1. Finally, we check (6) by applying Step 1 to deterministic µ and again using uniqueness of the SDE (3.4) to find that both (3.5) and (3.6) hold for ρ-a.e. ν.
3.5. Applications of Theorem 3.10. It is admittedly quite difficult to check that there exists a universally admissible, locally optimal control, and we will leave this problem open in all but the simplest cases. Note, however, that conditions (2) and (3) of Definition 3.9 hold automatically when α(t, w, x, ν) =α ′ (t, w, x 0 , ν), for someα
A simple class of examples. Suppose A ⊂ R k is convex, g ≡ 0, and f = f (t, µ, a) is twice differentiable in a with uniformly negative Hessian in a. That is, D 2 a f (t, µ, a) ≤ −δ for all (t, µ), for some δ > 0. Suppose as usual that assumption A holds. Definê
It is straightforward to check that assumption C holds and thatα is a universally admissible and locally optimal control. Of course, this example is simple in that the state process does not influence the optimization.
A possible general strategy. The following approach may be more widely applicable. First, for a fixed ν ∈ P p (X ), we may define the value function V [ν](t, x) of the corresponding optimal control problem in the usual way, and it should solve a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) PDE of the form
, where the Hamiltonian
Suppose that we can show (as is well known to be possible in very general situations) that for each ν the value function V [ν] is the unique (viscosity) solution of this HJB equation. Then, an optimal control can be obtained by findingα(t, x t , ν) which achieves the supremum in
, for each (t, x, ν). The crux of this approach is to show that the value function V [ν](t, x) is adapted with respect to ν in some sense, which would imply thatα is universally admissible and locally optimal. A nice special case would be a Markovian dependence, V [ν](t, x) = V (t, x, ν x t ). In short, we must study the dependence of a family of HJB equations on a path-valued parameter.
Mean field games on a canonical space
In this section, we begin to work toward the proofs of the main results announced in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. This section briefly elaborates on the notion of mean field game solution on the canonical space, in order to state simpler conditions by which may check that a measure P ∈ P(Ω) is a weak MFG solution, in the sense of Definition 2.2. The definitions and notations of this section are again mostly borrowed from [11] , to which the reader is referred for more details.
First, we mention some notational conventions. We will routinely use the same letter φ to denote the natural extension of a function φ : E → F to any product space E × E ′ , given by φ(x, y) := φ(x) for (x, y) ∈ E × E ′ . Similarly, we will use the same symbol (F t ) t∈[0,T ] to denote the natural extension of a filtration (F t ) t∈[0,T ] on a space E to any product space E × E ′ , given by (
We will make use of the following canonical spaces, two of which have been defined already but are recalled for convenience:
From now on, let ξ, B, W , µ, Λ, and X denote the identity maps on 
There is somewhat of a conflict in notation, between our use of (ξ, B, W ) here as the identity map on R d × C m0 × C m and our previous use (beginning in Section 2.3) of the same letters for random variables with values in (
n , defined on an n-player environment E n = (Ω n , (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] , P n , ξ, B, W ). However, we will almost exclusively discuss the random variables (ξ, B, W ) through the lenses of various probability measures, and thus it should be clear from context (i.e. from the nearest notated probability measure) which random variables (ξ, B, W ) we are working with at any given moment. For example, given P ∈ P(Ω), the notation P • (ξ, B, W )
On the other hand, P n is reserved for the measure on Ω n in a typical n-player environment, and so P n • (ξ, B, W ) −1 refers to a measure on (
Recall that the initial state distribution λ ∈ P
(Note that the set M λ was denoted
; we prefer this shorter notation mainly because we will make no use of it after this section.) For ρ ∈ M λ , the class A(ρ) of admissible controls is the set of probability measures Q on Ω 0 × P p (X ) × V satisfying:
We say Q ∈ A(ρ) is a strict control if there exists an A-valued process (α t ) t∈[0,T ] , progressively measurable with respect to the Q-completion of (F ξ,B,W,µ,Λ t
We say Q ∈ A(ρ) is a strong control if the above holds but with (α t ) t∈[0,T ] progressively measurable with respect to the Q-completion of (F 
Viewing Y as a random element of C d , let R(Q) := Q • (ξ, B, W, µ, Λ, Y ) −1 ∈ P(Ω) denote the joint law of the solution and the inputs. Define RA(ρ) := R(A(ρ)) = {R(Q) : Q ∈ A(ρ)} , which we think of as the set of admissible joint laws for the optimal control problem associated to ρ. Alternatively, R(Q) may be defined as the unique element P of P(Ω) such that P •(ξ, B, W, µ, Λ) −1 = Q and such that the canonical processes (ξ, B, W, µ, Λ, X) verify the state SDE on Ω:
It follows from standard estimates (e.g. [11, Lemma 2.4]) that R(Q) ∈ P p (Ω).
Recalling the definition of the objective functional Γ from (2.4), we define the reward associated to an element P ∈ P p (Ω) by
Define the set of optimal controls corresponding to ρ by
and note that
Let us now adapt the definition of MFG solution to the canonical space Ω:
Definition 4.1 (MFG pre-solution). We say P ∈ P(Ω) is a MFG pre-solution if it satisfies the following:
(1) ξ, W , and (B, µ) are independent under P . (2) P ∈ RA(ρ) where ρ :
s. That is, µ is a version of the conditional law of (W, Λ, X)
given (B, µ).
The following two Lemmas give us a characterization of MFG solution which is convenient for taking limits. The first is more or less obvious, stated as a Lemma merely for emphasis, while the second has more content and is discussed thoroughly in [11] . Lemma 4.2 (Lemma 3.9 of [11] ). Let P ∈ P p (Ω), and define ρ := P • (ξ, B, W, µ) −1 . If P is an MFG pre-solution and P ∈ RA * (ρ), then P is a weak MFG solution in the sense of Definition 2.2. Then P is a MFG pre-solution.
We close the section with three useful results from [11] , topological in nature. They will not be used until the final step of the proof of Theorem 2.6, in Section 5.4. Lemma 4.5. The map J : P p (Ω) → R is upper semicontinuous, and for each ρ ∈ M λ the sets A * (ρ) and RA * (ρ) are nonempty and compact. Moreover, the restriction of J to a set K ⊂ P p (Ω) is continuous whenever K satisfies the uniform integrability condition
Proof. This is all covered by Lemma 3.13 of [11] , except for the final claim. Now let P n → P ∞ in P p (Ω) with P n ∈ K for each n. The continuity and growth assumptions on g imply that
, and the f term causes the only problems. The convergence P n → P ∞ implies (e.g. by [35, Theorem 7.12 
For 1 ≤ n ≤ ∞, define probability measures Q n on Ω :
Certainly Q n → Q ∞ weakly in P( Ω). Since the [0, T ]-marginal is the same for each Q n , it is known (e.g. [22] or [29, Lemma A.3] ) that this implies φ dQ n → φ dQ ∞ for each bounded measurable φ : Ω → R with φ(t, ·) continuous for each t. Thus The following definition highlights a useful subclass of admissible controls, which Lemma 4.7 shows is dense in the class of admissible controls in a sense. where φ is adapted and compact and
Proof. Lemma 3.11 of [11] covers the first claim in the case that A is bounded, while the general case is treated in the second step of the proof of Lemma 3.17 in [11] . Except for the claim that K satisfies the uniform integrability condition (4.3), the second statement is precisely Lemma 3.17 of [11] , the proof of which elucidates this uniform integrability.
Proof of Theorem 2.6
With the mean field game concisely summarized on the canonical space, we now turn to the proof of Theorem 2.6. Throughout the section, we work with the notation and assumptions of Theorem 2.6. Following Lemma 4.2, the strategy is to prove the claimed relative compactness, then that any limit is a MFG pre-solution using Lemma 4.3, and then finally that any limit corresponds to an optimal control. First, we establish some useful estimates for the n-player systems.
5.1.
Estimates. The first estimate below, Lemma 5.1, is fairly standard, but it is important that it is independent of the number of agents n. The second estimate, Lemma 5.2, will be used to establish some uniform integrability of the equilibrium controls, and it is precisely where we need the coercivity of the running cost f . Note in the following proofs that the initial states X 
Proof. We omit [β] from the notation throughout the proof, as well as the superscript P n which should appear above the expectations. Abbreviate Σ := σσ
Apply the Burkholder-DavisGundy inequality and assumption (A.4) to find a universal constant C > 0 (which will change from line to line) such that, for all γ ∈ [p,
The last line follows from the bound ( z
, which holds because γ ≥ p. To deal with the γ/2 outside of the time integral, we used the following argument. If γ ≥ 2, we simply use Jensen's inequality to pass γ/2 inside of the time integral, and then use the inequality |x| pσ γ/2 ≤ 1 + |x| γ , which holds because p σ ≤ 2. The other case is 1 ∨ p σ ≤ p ≤ γ < 2, and we use then the inequalities |x| γ/2 ≤ 1 + |x| and |x| pσ ≤ 1 + |x| γ . By Gronwall's inequality,
for each k, and average over k = 1, . . . , n to get
Apply Gronwall's inequality once again to prove the second claimed inequality. The first claim follows from the second and from (5.1).
Lemma 5.2. There exist constants c 6 , c 7 > 0, depending only p, p ′ , T , and the constants c 1 , c 2 , c 3 of assumption A, such that for each β = (β 1 , . . . , β n ) ∈ A n n (E n ), the following hold:
(2) If for some n ≥ k ≥ 1, ǫ > 0, and β k ∈ A n (E n ) we have
the upper bound of assumption (A.5) implies that
n (E n ) and 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Proof of (1): First, use the upper bounds of f and g from assumption (A.5) to get
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 5.1 (and c 5 ≥ 1). This proves the first claim, with c 6 := 6c 5 c 2 (T + 1)/c 3 and c 7 := c 6 ∨ (1/c 3 ). Proof of (2): Fix a 0 ∈ A arbitrarily. Abuse notation somewhat by writing a 0 in place of the constant strict control (δ a0 ) t∈[0,T ] ∈ A n (E n ). Lemma 5.1 implies
Use the hypothesis along with the lower bounds on f and g from assumption (A.5) to get Proof of (3): If β is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, then applying (2) with
The proof is completed by averaging over k = 1, . . . , n, rearranging terms, and replacing c 6 by c 6 + c 7 .
5.2.
Relative compactness and MFG pre-solution. This section proves that (P n ) ∞ n=1 , defined in (2.8), is relatively compact and that each limit point is a MFG pre-solution. First, we state a tailor-made tightness result for Itô processes. It is essentially an application of Aldous' criterion, but the proof is deferred to Section B. 
where the following hold:
d×k is progressively measurable, and
is jointly measurable with respect to the progressive σ-field on [0, T ] × Θ and the Borel σ-field on A.
(That is, we vary over Σ, B, Z, k, and the probability space.) Then, for any triangular array {κ n,i :
is relatively compact in P p (Ω), and
Proof. We first establish (5.2). Since Λ n is a ǫ n -Nash equilibrium, part (3) of Lemma 5.2 implies
The right-hand side above is bounded in n, because of hypothesis (2.7) and because
Recall in the last line that c 5 ≥ 1. From (5.3) we conclude that sup n κ n < ∞, and (5.2) follows.
To prove that (P n ) ∞ n=1 , it suffices to show that each family of marginals is relatively compact (e.g. by [29 
is a singleton, it is trivially compact. We may apply Proposition 5.3 to show that
forms a relatively compact sequence. Indeed, in the notation of Proposition 5.3, we use Z = (
Since c 5 ≥ 1, we have 1 n n i=1 κ n,i ≤ 2κ n , and so sup n 1 n n i=1 κ n,i < ∞. Thus, Proposition 5.3 establishes the relative compactness of (P n • (Λ, X) −1 ) ∞ n=1 . Next, note that P n • (W, Λ, X) −1 is the mean measure of P n • µ −1 for each n, since for each bounded measurable φ : X → R we have
Since also
the relative compactness of (
Indeed, when p = 0 and P 0 is given the topology of weak convergence, this is a well known result of Sznitman, stated in (2.5) of the proof of [ Lemma 5.5. Any limit point P of (P n )
Proof. We abuse notation somewhat by assume that P n → P , with the understanding that this is along a subsequence. We check that P satisfies the four conditions of Lemma 4.3.
(1) Of course,
. Hence B and W are Wiener processes on (Ω, (F ξ,B,W,µ,Λ,X t
. under P n with common law P • (ξ, W ) −1 for each n, the law of large numbers implies
This implies
This shows (B, µ) is independent of (ξ, W ) under P . Since ξ i and W i are independent under P n , it follows that ξ and W are independent under P n , for each n. Thus ξ and W are independent under P , and we conclude that ξ, W , and (B, µ) are independent under P . (3) Let φ : X → R and ψ : C m0 × P p (X ) → R be bounded and continuous. Then
verify the state SDE under P n , the canonical processes (ξ, B, W, µ, Λ, X) verify the state equation (4.1) under each P n , for each n. It follows from the results of Kurtz and Protter [28] that the state equation holds under the limit measure P as well.
5.3.
Modified finite-player games. The last step of the proof, executed in the next Section 5.4, is to show that any limit P of P n is optimal. This step is more involved, and we devote this subsection to studying a useful technical device which we call the k-modified n-player game, in which agent k is removed from the empirical measures. Intuitively, if the n-player game is modified so that the empirical measure (present in the state process dynamics and objective functions) no longer includes agent k, then the optimization problem of agent k de-couples from that of the other agents; agent k may then treat the empirical measure of the other n − 1 agents as fixed and thus faces exactly the type of control problem encountered in the MFG. Let us make this idea precise.
For
The last line followed from the Lipschitz assumption (A.4), along with the observation that
. By Gronwall's inequality (updating the constant C),
Now we define a standard coupling of the empirical measures µ x and µ −k,x : first, draw a number j from {1, . . . , n} uniformly at random, and consider X j to be a sample from µ
to be a sample from µ −k,x , but if j = k, draw another number j ′ from {1, . . . , n}\{k} uniformly at random, and choose Y 5.4. Optimality in the limit. Before we complete the proof, recall the definitions of R, A, and A * from Section 4. The final step is to show that P ∈ RA * (P • (ξ, B, W, µ) −1 ), for any limit P of (P n ) ∞ n=1 . The idea of the proof is to use the density of adapted controls (see Lemma 4.7) to construct nearly optimal controls for the MFG with nice continuity properties. From these controls we build admissible controls for the n-player game, and it must finally be argued that the inequality obtained from the ǫ n -Nash assumption on Λ n may be passed to the limit.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Let P be a limit point of (P n ) ∞ n=1 , which we know exists by Lemma 5.5, and again abuse notation by assuming that P n → P . Let ρ := P • (ξ, B, W, µ) −1 . We know from Lemma 5.4 that P is a MFG pre-solution, and in light of Lemma 5.5 we need only to check that P is optimal. Fix some Q * ∈ A * (ρ), and set P * := R(Q * ). (Lemma 4.5 assures us that A * (ρ) is nonempty.) By Lemma 4.7, there exist compact adapted functions φ i : Ω 0 × P p (X ) → V (see Definition 4.6) such that (1) φ i (ω, ·) is continuous for each ω ∈ Ω 0 , and (2) Q * = lim i→∞ Q i , and J(R(Q * )) = lim i→∞ J(R(Q i )), where
Fix δ > 0, and find i 0 large enough that
Set Q := Q i0 andφ := φ i0 , for ease of notation; we will use no other φ i or Q i from now on. For
It follows from Lemma 5.6 that
does not depend on n, the continuity ofφ(ω, ·) for each ω ∈ Ω 0 implies (using e.g. [29, Lemma A.3] to deal with the possible discontinuity ofφ in ω)
It is fairly straightforward to check that R is a linear map, and it is even more straightforward to check that J is linear. Moreover, sinceφ is a compact function, the continuity of R and J of Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 imply 12) where the last step used (5.11). Now, for k ≤ n, define β n,k ∈ A n (E n ) by
Since agent k is removed from the empirical measure, we have µ
The key point is that for each k ≤ n,
To prove (5.13), let P ′ denote the measure on the left-hand side. Since
Since the processes
verify the state SDE (4.1) on (Ω n , (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] , P n ), the canonical processes (ξ, B, W, µ, Λ, X) verify the state SDE (4.1) under P ′ . Hence, P ′ = R(Q n,k ). With (5.13) in hand, by definition of J the inequality (5.12) then translates to
Before completing the proof, we check more technical point:
Indeed, it follows from Lemma 5.1 (and an obvious analog for the modified state processes Y ) that
Lemma 5.4 says that
Compactness ofφ implies that there exists a compact set K ⊂ A such that β n,k
and we have the uniform integrability needed to deduce (5.15), from Lemma 5.6 and from the continuity and growth assumptions (A.5) on f and g.
A simple manipulation of the definitions yields J(P n ) = 1 n n k=1 J k (Λ n ). Then, since P n → P , the upper semicontinuity of J of Lemma 4.5 implies
Finally, use the fact that Λ n is a relaxed ǫ n -Nash equilibrium to get
The second line follows from the definition of J k , and the ǫ n k drops out because of the hypothesis (2.7). The third line comes from (5.15), and the last is from (5.14). Since P ∈ RA(ρ), and since δ > 0 was arbitrary, this shows that P ∈ RA * (ρ).
Proof of Theorem 2.11
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.11, which we split into two pieces.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose assumptions A and B hold. Let P ∈ P(Ω) be a weak MFG solution. Then there exist, for each n,
such that lim n→∞ ǫ n = 0 and P n → P in P p (Ω), where
Theorem 6.1 is nearly the same as Theorem 2.11, except that the equilibria Λ n are now relaxed instead of strong, and the environments E n are now part of the conclusion of the theorem instead of the input. We will prove Theorem 6.1 by constructing a convenient sequence of environments E n , which all live on the same larger probability space supporting an i.i.d. sequence of state processes corresponding to the given MFG solution. This kind of argument is known as trajectorial propagation of chaos in the literature on McKean-Vlasov limits, and the Lipschitz assumption in the measure argument is useful here. The precise choice of environments also facilitates the proof of the following Proposition. Recall the definition of a strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium from Remark 2.3 and the discussion preceding it. Proposition 6.2. Let E n be the environments defined in the proof of Theorem 6.1 (in Section 6.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.11. Recall that strong strategies are insensitive to the choice of n-player environment (see Remark 2.12), and so it suffices to prove the theorem on any given sequence of environments, such as those provided by Theorem 6.1. By Theorem 6.1 we may find ǫ n → 0 and a relaxed (ǫ n , . . . , ǫ n )-Nash equilibrium Λ n for the n-player game, with the desired convergence properties. Then, by Proposition 6.2, we find for each n each k a strong ǫ n,k = (ǫ n +ǫ n,k 1 , . . . , ǫ n +ǫ n,k n )-Nash equilibrium Λ n,k ∈ A n n (E n ) with the convergence properties defined in Proposition 6.2. For each n, choose k n large enough to make ǫ n,kn i ≤ 2 −n for each i = 1, . . . , n and so that the sequences in (1-3) of Proposition 6.2 are each within 2 −n of their respective limits.
6.1. Construction of environments. Fix a weak MFG solution P . Define P B,µ := P • (B, µ) −1 . We will work on the space Ω :
) denote the identity map (i.e. coordinate processes) on Ω. For n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, consider the complete filtration (F n t ) t∈[0,T ] generated by U , B, µ, and (
. Define the probability measure P on (Ω, F ∞ T ) by
) are independent under P. We will work with the n-player environments
and we will show that the canonical process (Λ 1 , . . . , Λ n ) is a relaxed (ǫ n , . . . , ǫ n )-Nash equilibrium for some ǫ n → ∞. Including the seemingly superfluous random variable U makes the class of admissible controls as rich as possible, in a sense which will be more clear later; until the proof of Proposition 6.2, U will be behind the scenes.
Define 
] only in the measure flow which appears in the dynamics; X i [β] depends on the empirical measure flow of (
] depends on the random measure µ coming from the MFG solution. Define the canonical n-player strategy profile by
. This abbreviation serves in part to indicate which n we are working with at any given moment, so that we can suppress the index n from the rest of the notation. Note that
6.2. Trajectorial propagation of chaos. Intuition from the theory of propagation of chaos suggests that the state processes (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) and (X 1 , . . . , X n ) should be close in some sense, and the purpose of this section is to make this quantitative. For β ∈ A n (E n ), abbreviate
Recall the definition of the metric d X on X from (5.5), and again define the p ′ -Wasserstein metric ℓ X ,p ′ on P p (X ) relative to the metric d X . 
There exists a sequence δ n > 0 converging to zero such that
is in RA(ρ) for each n, and since P is in RA * (ρ), we have
Thus, from (6.5) and (6.6) it follows that
where of course in the last step we have used (6.4). Since ǫ n ≥ 0, this shows ǫ n → 0.
Proof of (6.5): First, apply Lemma 6.4 with β = Λ 1 (so that (Λ n,−1 , β) = Λ n ) to get
where the limit is taken in P p (Ω). Moreover, since E
we use the continuity of J of Lemma 4.5 (since the additional uniform integrability condition holds trivially) to conclude that
Proof of (6.6): This step is fairly involved and thus divided into several steps. The first two steps identify a relative compactness for the laws of the empirical measure and state process pairs, crucial for the third and fourth steps below.
Step (3) focuses on the g term, and
Step (4) uses the additional assumption B to deal with the f term.
Proof of (6.6),
Step (1): We show first that
We show next that S R is relatively compact in
Note first that it follows from Lemma 5.1 that
By symmetry, we have
and by Proposition 5.3 this set is relatively compact in P p (C d ). For β ∈ A R , the mean measure of
and it follows again from Proposition 5.3 that the family
. From this and (6.8) we conclude that 6.4. Proof of Proposition 6.2. Throughout the section, the number of agents n is fixed, and we work on the n-player environment E n specified in Section 6.1. The proof of Proposition 6.2 is split into two main steps. In this first step, we approximate the relaxed strategy Λ 0 by bounded strong strategies, and we check the convergences (1) and (2) claimed in Proposition 6.2. The second step verifies the somewhat more subtle inequality (3) of Proposition 6.2.
Remark 6.5. Propositions 6.2, 2.4, and 3.3 are really just instances of the density of strong (and strict) controls in the class of weak controls, in a sense made precise by Lemma 4.7. Indeed, a consequence of Lemma 4.7 may be stated more transparently as follows. Suppose ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P ) is a filtered probability space supporting a (F t ) t∈[0,T ] -Wiener process W (of any dimension), an F 0 -measurable random variable ξ living in some Euclidean space, and a progressively measurable P(A)-
Before we prove Proposition 6.2, we need the following lemma, which is a simple variant of a standard result:
with the limit taken in
Proof. This is analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.4, given in [11] , which is itself an instance of a standard method proving weak convergence of SDE solutions, so we only sketch the proof. It can be shown as in Proposition 5.
Using the results of Kurtz and Protter [28] , it is straightforward to check that under any limit point the canonical processes satsify a certain SDE, and the claimed convergence follows from uniqueness of the SDE solution.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 6.2.
Step 1: Define V analogously to V, but with A replaced by A n . That is, V is the set of measures q on [0, T ] × A n with first marginal equal to Lebesgue measure and with
Endow V with the p-Wasserstein metric. Define
and identify this P(A n )-valued process with the random element Λ 0 := dtΛ 0 t (da) of V. By Lemma 4.7 (see also Remark 6.5), with A replaced by A n , there exists a sequence of bounded A n -valued processes α k = (α k,1 , . . . , α k,n ) such that, if we define
then we have
and lim
. . , a n ) := (t, a i ), we note that the map V ∋ q → q •π
, and conclude that lim
It follows from the uniform integrability (6.12) and the continuity of J of Lemma 4.5 that
This verifies (1) and (2) of Proposition 6.2.
Step 2: It remains to justify the inequality (3) of Proposition 6.2. We prove this only for i = 1, since the cases i = 2, . . . , n are identical. For each k find β k ∈ A n (E n ) such that
First, use Lemma 5.2(2) to get
holds by construction, for i = 2, . . . , n, it follows that
It follows as in Proposition 5.3 (or more precisely [29, Proposition B.4] ) that the set
. Hence, the set
is relatively compact in
by [29, Lemma A.2] ). By the following Lemma 6.7, every limit point P of (P k ) ∞ k=1 is of the form
This implies lim sup
Because of (6.13), this completes the proof of Proposition 6.2.
Lemma 6.7. Every limit point P of (P k ) ∞ k=1 (defined in (6.14)) is of the form (6.15).
Proof. Let us abbreviate
. . , X n )) denote the identity map on Ω (n) , and let (F (n) t ) t∈[0,T ] denote the natural filtration,
Fix a limit point P of P k . It is easily verified that P satisfies
Moreover, for each k, we know that B and W are independent (F (n) t ) t∈[0,T ] -Wiener processes under P k , and thus this is true under P as well. Note that (B, W, (
) satisfy the state SDE under P, or equivalently under P k the canonical processes verify the SDE
The results of Kurtz and Protter [28] imply that this passes to the limit: The canonical processes on Ω (n) verify the same SDE under P .
It remains only to show that there exists β ∈ A n (E n ) such that
Indeed, from uniqueness in law of the solution of the SDE (6.17) it will then follow that
The independent uniform random variable U built into E n now finally comes into play. Using a well known result from measure theory (e.g. On the other hand, (6.19) implies that the conditional law under P of Λ 1 given (X 0 , B, W, Λ 2 , . . . , Λ n )
is the same as the conditional law under P of β 1 (U, X 0 , B, W ) given X 0 , B, W, β 2 (U, X 0 , B, W ), . . . , β n (U, X 0 , B, W ) .
This completes the proof of (6.18).
Proof of Theorem 3.4
This section explains the proof of Theorem 3.4, which specializes the main results to the setting without common noise essentially by means of the following simple observation. Note that although we assume σ 0 ≡ 0 throughout the section, weak MFG solution has the same meaning as in Definition 2.1, distinct from Definition 3.1 of weak MFG solution without common noise.
Lemma 7.1. If ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, B, W, µ, Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution, then ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution without common noise. Conversely, if ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution without common noise, then we may construct (by enlarging the probability space, if necessary) an m 0 -dimensional Wiener process B independent of (W, µ, Λ, X) such that ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, B, W, µ, Λ, X) is a weak MFG solution.
Proof. The only difficulty comes from the conditional independence required in condition (3) of both Definitions 2.1 and 3.1, and it is convenient here to reformulate the definitions slightly. Lemma 4.3 tells us that Definition 2.1 of a weak MFG solution is equivalent to an alternative definition, in which the conditional independence is omitted from condition (3) and is added to condition (5). To be precise, define the following conditions: 
Indeed, this follows from the density of strong controls provided by Lemma 4.7 (see also Remark 6.5). Analogously, for the setting without common noise, consider the following condition: Conversely, let ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P, W, µ, Λ, X) be a weak MFG solution without common noise, and assume without loss of generality that ( Ω, (F t ) t∈[0,T ] , P ) supports an (F t ) t∈[0,T ] -Wiener process B of dimension m 0 which is independent of (W, µ, Λ, X). Again, condition (3.a) as well as (1), (2), and (4) of Definition 2.1 clearly hold. The consistency condition µ = P ((W, Λ, X) ∈ · | µ) and the independence of B and (W, µ, Λ, X) imply µ = P ((W, Λ, X) ∈ · | B, µ). Proof of Theorem 3.4. At this point, the proof is mostly straightforward. The first claim, regarding the adaptation of Theorem 2.6, follows immediately from Theorem 2.6 and the observation of Lemma 7.1. The second claim, about adapting Theorem 2.11, is not so immediate but requires nothing new. First, notice that Theorem 6.1 remains true if we replace "weak MFG solution" by "weak MFG solution without common noise," and if we define P n instead by (3.2); this is a consequence of Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 7.1. Then, we must only check that Proposition 6.2 remains true if we replace "strong" by "very strong," and if we replace the conclusion (1) by
It is straightforward to check that the proof of Proposition 6.2 given in Section 6.4 translates mutatis mutandis to this new setting. Step 1: We first show that every strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Suppose Λ = (Λ 1 , . . . , Λ n ) ∈ A n n (E n ) is a strong ǫ-Nash equilibrium on E n . Lemma 5.2(3) implies where the supremum is over stopping times τ valued in [0, T ]. The Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality implies that there exists a constant C ′ > 0 (which again depends only on c, T , and p and will change from line to line) such that, for any i and any P ∈ Q κn,i , Putting this all together proves (B.3).
